This is a chapter of resistance first written with students in mind. These students struggled with a teacher education system that pushed to the side everything that they most valued. They were a committed bunch: Some were outdoor educators, others environmental educators, and yet others were immersed in issues of social justice. All wanted more than they were experiencing. I shared their frustration. In this chapter, I reveal some of the issues underlying our frustration, and point in some directions for reimagining education.

I begin with William Wordsworth, and suggest that elements of his poetry are protests about what counts as worthwhile knowledge. Second, I take up Arne Næss’s claim that the cognitive value of feelings is typically undervalued. This challenges ideas that emotional understanding should be separated from rationality and labeled affective, and/or separated into objective and subjective categories. I then discuss the epistemological importance of experiential and emotional understanding in education and relationships between these understandings and ethics. Finally, I suggest strategies that educators might use to resist marginalization of experiential-emotional aspects of cognitive understanding in formal and other educational settings.

ON EXPERIENCES

Think for a minute about your own education. What are the learning experiences that you remember best? Which have been most influential, or powerful, in shaping your life? Now think about their nature. Were they experiences that are common in schools and other educational settings? Were they experiences that are amenable to measurement and evaluation? Could they have been predicted in advance, or even found in the expected outcomes of a curriculum? During informal polls of groups that I have been with lately, the answer for many has been no.

These are admittedly broad questions and I have asked them to open a little space for reflecting on significant learning experiences that often seem to exist at the margins of mainstream education. I have also asked them because “understanding” in, and of, this chapter might require some reflection on past, and perhaps common, experiences. I wish to explore the nature of these
experiences—some of them at least. And, I want to speculate about dangers in relegating them to the perimeters.

These thoughts and questions, and hence this chapter, were given more focus by a graduate student who asked me, “Why are students so happy when you take them outside somewhere for a field trip?” I am sure that there are many reasons, some being more psychological. But it seems that these questions are too important to be left to psychologists alone; I think there are also reasons that lean more toward the philosophical, with important educational implications. With this in mind, I limit this chapter to those significant experiences that involve field-based, or outside of the classroom learning. I begin with the assumptions that “field trip” learning is quintessentially experiential in nature, that these experiences enable an important way of knowing, and that this knowing is deeply personal, emotional in nature, and lies at the heart of our ability to be ethical beings. So, this chapter is about epistemology, emotions, and ethics and how they can be informed by experiential learning.

Although I understand that important educational experiences do not always take place in formal settings, I argue that we should make curricular space for the kinds of knowledge and/or experience that helps students conduct thoughtful lives. I am reminded of E. F. Schumacher (1977), who said the following:

All through school and university I had been given maps of life and knowledge on which there was hardly a trace of many of the things that I most cared about and that seemed to me to be of the greatest possible importance to the conduct of my life. I remembered that for many years my perplexity had been complete; and no interpreter had come along to help me. It remained complete until I ceased to suspect the sanity of my perceptions and began, instead, to suspect the soundness of the maps. (p. 1)

I suspect that these words will resonate with some of you; they do with me. And they lead to another assumption. This chapter rests on the idea that ways of knowing that have the capacity to enhance abilities to be thoughtful and ethical beings deserve some space in school curricula (and in other learning settings). Put another way, Richard Peters (1973) once argued that it would be unreasonable “to deprive anyone of access in an arbitrary way to forms of understanding which might throw light on alternatives open to him [or her]” (p. 256).

**Romantic Resistance**

For me, a good place to start is with Wordsworth, a Romantic poet of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. To be clear, my interest in Wordsworth is not primarily as a nature poet, but rather as a social critic. As Neil Evernden (1985) interprets, these poets went to wild places, not because they were nature lovers, but because these places were thought to be less hostile to their task. In remote corners of England (and Europe) they pondered an emergent industrial revolution and the knowledge it rested on.

For industrialists, scientists, and technicians of the era a new and “enlightened” knowledge system was required. It was, as René Descartes (1637/1969) describes more than a century earlier, a system with a profound distrust of sensory experiences, “because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it” (p. 127). And it was a system that privileged a particular form of reason:

For finally, whether we are awake or asleep, we should never allow ourselves to be persuaded excepting by the evidence of our Reason. And it must be remarked that I speak of our Reason and not of our imagination nor of our senses. (p. 132)
For Descartes the purest form of reason was in the measurability and computations of mathematics. Obtaining measurement often requires reducing a phenomenon or an entity into measurable parts. Many (e.g., Evernden, 1985) call this process Cartesian reductionism.

Wordsworth also objected to another piece of this knowledge system: a radical separation between humans and other living beings. Whereas humans are capable of reasoning, Descartes (1637/1969) compared animals to automata, or machines. The inability to reason and communicate shows not merely that these “brutes have less reason than men, but that they have none at all” (p. 139). Having no reason, “it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels and weights, can tell the hours and measure time” (p. 140). Himself a busy vivisectionist, Descartes even doubted animal exclamations of pain, attributing them to mechanical events in mechanical creatures.

Against this backdrop, Wordsworth (1798/1959a), the social critic, rejected his friend Matthew’s expostulation:

Why William, on that old grey stone,
Thus for the length of half a day,
Why William, sit you thus alone,
And dream your time away?

Wordsworth’s reply is defiant:

The eye it cannot chuse but see,
We cannot bid the ear be still;
Our bodies feel, where’er they be,
Against, or with our will.
Nor less I deem that here are powers,
Which of themselves our minds impress,
That we can feed this mind of ours,
In a wise passiveness. (p. 194)

For Wordsworth, important learning accrues through sensory experiences. He asserts that we are “fed” in important and wise ways by experiences on their own terms. And, he, thus, resists the privileged epistemology of his day.

Wordsworth (1798/1959b) also rejects prevailing discourse about the mechanistic nature of animals. In a companion poem to the one cited above, he boldly critiques the Cartesian legacy:

Our meddling intellect
Misshapes the beauteous forms of things
— We murder to dissect. (p. 195)

In reading Wordsworth, I find his work is importantly about resistance—resistance to an epistemology that allowed no room for human senses, feelings, and even ethics.

Now, I ask myself: Can these comments be reflected in my own learning? And, if so, is there something about this learning that brings about happiness? Pondering these questions, I began to reflect on some of my own experiences—in this case they happened in wilderness (although they might easily have happened elsewhere). Could I test Wordsworth’s claims through an exposition of my own experiences? Did my experiences lead to broadened possibilities for
experiential understanding? For renewed relations with the more-than-human world? The result was the following reflection.

The Mountain River

On a river in northern Canada a canoe trip began. As the drone of the departing bush plane faded, we were left with piles of gear and canoes on boggy hummocks. We called this home for a few days. As on previous trips, we toiled to assemble everything on higher ground for camping. We did so with the acrid smell of smoke in our noses and its sting in our eyes. This year the north was on fire during one of the “worst” forest fire seasons in some time. Periodically, we looked up from our loads. Peering through the blue haze we tried to appreciate the magnificent vistas in the headwaters of an alpine river. Admittedly, we were disappointed. What would this all look like without the smoke? What a pity.

What a pity indeed—not because of the fires, however. We weren’t looking at the vista through smoky lenses, but rather glasses tinted by the temper of our culture. This is normal at the beginning of trips to new places. We enjoy the immediate gratification of beautiful vistas—castellated ridges, and deep green valleys. And surely this is an important part of wilderness tripping. It is the first step in reconnecting us to the earth in a place. This time, with expectations a little thwarted, we moved slowly, even lethargically, while settling in. We longed for a clear day.

It doesn’t have to be like this. When the forests last burned so vigorously and for so long, I travelled down Yukon’s Snake River with long-time wilderness activist Dave Foreman. He revelled in the smoke. For him, forest fires were an act of wild defiance—something beyond human control. This is not to be confused with a callousness for those threatened by fires. Rather, it was the wonder of wildness in a world where humans normally strive to be in control. He felt the wildness in his eyes and his lungs, and it was something to celebrate, it had become part of himself—literally. A shift in perspective can make a difference.

Remembering Dave Foreman helped a little. So did walking in the mountains where we felt the ground beneath our feet, aching in our city-soft thighs, and the sting of hail pelting our shoulders. We walked to the river, too, and marvelled at a landscape where no human path showed the way. Yet there was something familiar about the landscape—beyond the resemblance with other mountainous headwaters. I felt it long before I understood it. It took me a few days to figure out the nature of this deeply embedded connection to this landscape. I felt something that transcended words and even memory. It was an embodied, know-it-in-your-bones kind of knowledge. In the end it was the Yellowlegs and their incessant lakeside chattering, a chattering familiar to all wilderness travellers in Northern Boreal Forests. It was this ubiquitous bird that reminded me of our essentially sensuous nature.

Still, why now? Why this bird? Its call so familiar, yet why did it stand out this year? And why did it bring such joy? I think I’d been missing it. It hasn’t been so common in recent years. The joy of hearing it seemed to grow from felt loss. Perhaps this was, to borrow an idea from poet Dennis Lee (2002), an example of “kintuition”—or a kind of kinaesthetic intuition involving a capacity to register rhythm, in this case of the landscape, without any identifiable mediation. A recent conversation with a local ornithologist seemed to confirm my kintuition. Though “hard data” is still scant, there seems to be a marked decline in shorebirds in North America. Sometimes the witness of our experience precedes our understanding.

I recently learned that the Yellowlegs of my experience is actually the Lesser Yellowlegs. I take this refined understanding as a small measure of growing intimacy. And, it is the Lesser Yellowlegs that has taught me, in a deeply personal way, that a slow, grinding, incremental loss is affecting Canada’s wildest places. The birds and the back eddies have helped me to understand
that we are wild places and they are us. What I have come to understand is deeply experiential, embodied, and beyond my ability to put it into words.

**Felt Learning And Feelings**

For me, there are several interesting aspects to this story, and points of resistance. First, at its very core, the learning experience was felt—understood in a bodily and sensuous way. In the end it was also an emotional learning experience. It cannot be disproved or falsified. It just was. It was only later, upon reflection, that it included elements of abstraction. And second, the telling of this story resists separations of mind and body, and mind and landscape. In the end, I become more than my mind, more than my physical manifestation; I become a *field of self* (Evernden, 1985) that includes relationships between my physical being and my experiences. And, finally, I acknowledge that my pre-existing social constructions of wilderness experiences do shape these experiences; but, for the careful listener, more-than-human others, places, and experiences also contribute to the shaping of who we become. It is a multifaceted becoming.

There isn’t space to thoroughly explore all aspects of this story. However, I would like to examine some questions that can have a bearing on schooling practices. How could one write a set of behavioural outcomes for this learning? How could it be reduced to measurable increments? Why is it that these embodied experiences can be so profound? And why can they bring happiness (sometimes, at least)? I think the answer to the last question lies in the impossibility of the first two. You just can't predict in advance what learning will take place within these kinds of experiential settings. And you can't measure it. Maybe that is part of the joy.

Some theorists remind us that many dominant types of analytic understanding rely on reason (Barry, 2002). But these are particular aspects of reason requiring particular outlooks—falsification in sciences, and scepticism in philosophy. Theoretically this makes some sense. If you have an idea and it can withstand the most intense scrutiny then chances are that it has some merit. And, granted, there can be a kind of pleasure (for some at least) in thinking through an elegant line of reasoning. But, for many such a nuanced, analytical reasoning can suck the joy and nourishment out of learning, especially when that’s all there is. Put another way, Jan Zwicky (1992) describes thinking analytically as like going on a diet:

> Its aim is a healthy austerity of thought, a certain trimness of mind. But carried too far, we’re only left with a skeleton. Carried too far too often, we lose the sense that something is amiss when the patient exhibits no life. We come to take pride in our cases of polished bone. (p. 154)

So complete is the loss of perspective, that educators can be awestruck by joy exhibited by students on field trips, freed from the constraints of structured and systematized learning (see also Price, chap. 4, this volume).

Personal experiential learning is different from the austere analytical thought Zwicky describes. You can know how an experience makes you feel. You can be thrilled to meet an old friend like the Lesser Yellowlegs, or a wolf, or a spider, or a penguicula, or Penguicula Creek. You can know the joy of watching a sunrise from a mountaintop or the pain of watching the destruction of a favourite haunt. You can feel anguish over a human’s suffering and you can feel the ecstasy of success.

In each of these experiential instances, the ontological attention is, as Zwicky (2002) suggests, a response to a particularity: *this* Lesser Yellowlegs, *this* wolf, or *this* sunrise. She adds:
the phenomenal experience of *thisness* is not of a complex series of relations shading off into
the temporally hazy distance. Rather, we are pierced. The *this* strikes into us like a shaft of
light. . . . The phenomenal experience often includes an awareness of not being able to give an
account of *this*—we can point, but not say. (p. 53)

In educational terms, the phenomenal experience will also be unaccountable in the language of
learning outcomes or measurable educational achievements.

If you are Inuit, and live in Arctic Canada, you can marvel at the sight of a thrush with
a red breast (a robin) but with no name in your Inuktitut language. And you can feel curious
about that, all by yourself, before anyone tells you about global warming. These feelings are
ways of knowing about the world. They are unique, deeply personal, and they exist, for some,
in the language of gestalts. If these feelings and knowing are respected, they can be free from
harassments and vexations like scepticism and falsification. They just are. They “don’t have reasons:
they announce themselves” (Zwicky, 2002, p. 92). And, just maybe this has something to do with
why students can be so happy on field trips.

But experiential and emotional learning are more than tips to make students happy; they
are profoundly important. As Aldo Leopold (1949/1970) once said, “We can be ethical only in
relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in” (p. 251).3 If
we ignore these kinds of emotional understandings, and the kinds of experiential learning that
can nourish them, we do so at our peril.

To be clear, I am emphatically not advocating abandonment of science or philosophical
reasoning. And I am not suggesting that emotional understanding is infallible or sufficient. I
can be mistaken when drawing inferences from this understanding, just as I can be mistaken
when relying on scientific or other aspects of knowing. Yet, I do maintain that experiential-
emotional understanding adds flesh and life to the bones so often polished smooth and white by
analytical thought. In the interests of epistemological breadth, I am trying to create more space
for experiential learning and all of the knowing and understanding that accrue in this way.

I am pondering emotional understanding—alongside processes of falsification and critical
reasoning—and its importance in the conduct of our lives. For example, when making major
decisions in life—about choosing partners, buying houses, caring for children—how many of us
make decisions that are based on logic alone? What room do we make, and should we make, for
more sensual, experiential, and emotional understanding? In what useful way can attention to these
dimensions of our knowing and being add important “data” to our overall understanding?

I am also pondering the consequences on not paying attention. Perhaps this was illustrated
in the senseless responses to Hurricane Katrina, where many residents of New Orleans felt ignored
and abandoned by their governments, and their president, in a time of crisis. And here I mean
that literally—senseless. When people are socioeconomically and racially separated, their sensual
contact is diminished or impossible. The feeling, touching, seeing, smelling, and “walk-a-mile-in-
their-shoes” knowing are absent. For each the “other” is an abstraction—perhaps even reducible
to mechanistic others, the antithesis of the particularity of *thisness*. The others have no face (see
Payne, chap. 18, this volume).

If this kind of experiential learning is so important, why does it generally seem to circle
the perimeter of education? Why does it seem marginalized? Or, “othered”? Consider briefly a
few possibilities.

First, a traditional scientific goal is to be objective; objectivity has been valorized. When
we allow our work to be classified in the “lesser” category of “subjective” we are acquiescing to
the language of the dominant cultural influences, the status quo, hegemonic forces. Perhaps we
should seek other ways to talk about our work that doesn’t place it in a position opposite to (and
lesser than) “objective.” Celebrating subjectivity might be one useful response, but I suspect that it would be worthwhile to reimagine other possibilities, too.

Second, we privilege particular aspects of cognitive learning but then hive off others into the dubious, and less prestigious category of “affective” learning. Perhaps as Næss (2002; Næss & Jickling, 2000) says, we do not pay enough attention to the cognitive value of feelings. Experiential and emotional understandings are not reducible to some dubious psychological category. As Robin Barrow and Ronald Woods (1982) argue, “there are uses of the word ‘understanding’ where the notions of feeling, emotion, attitude, empathy, etc., are involved” (p. 55).

Third, many dominant approaches to education do not seem to pay so much attention to those things that they cannot give an account of, or say, or measure—the things to which we can only point. It is interesting to consider that Benjamin Bloom and his team (Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia, 1964), who coined the term affective domain, acknowledge this when they observed trends in the erosion of “affective objectives” in which:

[T]he original intent of a course or educational program becomes worn down to that which can be explicitly evaluated for grading purposes and that which can be taught easily through verbal materials (lectures, discussions, reading materials, etc.). (p. 16)

Yet, they later argue, that if affective goals are to be realized:

They must be defined clearly; learning experiences to help the student develop in the desired direction must be provided; and there must be some systematic method for appraising the extent to which students grow in desired ways. (p. 23)

It would be nice to think that the ideas of Bloom and his team are now a bit quaint and dated, but I do not see much evidence of this. It is not possible to effectively evaluate everything that is important; so let’s just get over it.

And finally, when a bold idea comes along with potential to challenge the status quo, it is often dismissed as “romantic.” But isn’t that the point? Education needs bold ideas. I would like to take back the word romantic and make it a symbol of resistance. Or, at least, resist its use in a dismissive or otherwise pejorative way.

Given much said in this essay, it might be tempting for some to think that I am really talking about a version of “nature education” again. Emphatically no! When I think of the kind of learning that I’m talking about, I also think about Israelis and Palestinians who work together, with ontological attentiveness, trying to resolve water issues—issues that boil down to matters of conservation, justice, and equity (i.e., Haddad, Zuzovsky, & Yakir, 2000; Zuzovsky, 2000). I think about students being with one another in a multiracial educational setting in southern Africa during the dark days of apartheid. I see the understanding—carefully, emotionally cognitive—that occurred when people could be together for the first time in their lives. It is this ontological attentiveness and its relationship with epistemology in all settings—those more social and those more wilderness—that I am pointing towards.

I also remember Arne Næss. When asked if deep questioning was enough to explore difficult questions he replies:

With deep prejudices you must use some examples of how you would behave in a particular situation. For instance, I was climbing a little with a strong supporter of Hitler in 1935. I had some pieces of bread and I said: “This was made by a Jewish girl. See if you can eat it anyhow.” Then he admitted: “Well I do not mean that absolutely every Jewish person is a terrible so and so. There are exceptions.” With reluctance he would then eat just a little of the bread.
But you see you have to, if you can, get into some practical situation—you start a walk somewhere, do something together and then—bang—you have an example. (Næss & Jickling, 2000, p. 51)

The cynical person might say, “Well, that example didn’t do very much to stop the Holocaust.” But the optimist might say, “Well, there weren’t enough people ‘sharing their bread.’” Seen another way, Næss gave face to a particular Jewish girl through the gift of bread (see Payne, chap. 18, this volume). The phenomenal experience of his climbing partner, expressed in the recognition that not every Jewish person was terrible, didn’t come with reasons; it just announced itself. Næss had no simple recipe for communicating, no specific learning outcomes. He did, however, have the wherewithal to point and hope (Zwicky, 2002).

It seems fitting to talk about resistance again, for surely that is another key part of Næss’s story. But Næss never looked for heroes, he has always advocated for little steps by many people—for many people to “share their bread.” So what about resistance? In the next section I point to a couple of examples as starting points for you to think about your own resistance.

**Bringing Resistance Home**

My faculty recently commissioned a report about its evaluation practices (Crocker, 2004). It found that, on average, our grades were substantially higher than in other faculties. There was discussion about this and a number of recommendations for remediation. The recommendation that interested me was that we should not give credit for attendance. Yet, for some kinds of learning “being there” is the essence. If we don’t acknowledge this in our course outlines, and practices, then we are implicitly saying it isn’t important.

I concede that “attendance” may not be the best word, but another term—maybe “experiential learning”—would be more descriptive. But in the end it amounts to pretty much the same thing. The important thing, for me, is to insist on having a little space to recognize the learning that is embodied, experiential, emotional, personal, and that doesn’t fit into traditional evaluation schemes.

In another instance, I taught a graduate environmental education course at another university that required instructors to include a “learning outcomes” grid on their course outlines. This involved selecting from a Domain List a series of preapproved program goals and related learning outcomes, and then lining these up with assessment criteria (Table 7.1). An accompanying “Assessment” required breaking down assignment grading into weightings for each of the selected learning outcomes (Fig. 7.1). Aside from not leaving much room for “just being” learning, it is stunningly ironic that I can critique Cartesian reductionism in my classes but am required to describe and assess this learning in such a reductionist manner.

So, why is this noteworthy now? Wordsworth critiques this same reductionism in 1798. In 1985, Evernden acknowledges that Descartes’ failings had already been amply discussed in philosophical literature. And here I, together with several authors in this volume, raise this issue again. Clearly, Cartesian thinking is remarkably resilient; it rests on assumptions so deeply buried in cultural norms as to be virtually invisible. How else can I explain that the university program just mentioned was guided by an eminent advisory group, and taught by experienced faculty, with the collective experience of centuries—people who should know better (and likely do know better)—yet it accepts planning and evaluation schemes as described in Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1? Evernden (1985) is as relevant today as he was more than two decades ago when he said, “we must confront those failings, for they obscure the need for alternatives” (p. 54). In his analysis,
Table 7.1. Learning Outcomes

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Learning Outcome</th>
<th>Assessment Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication 1.1</td>
<td>Communicate effectively in writing using several media and techniques.</td>
<td>Well-written, coherent, skilled use of English language, APA formatted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication 1.2</td>
<td>Communicate effectively in person using appropriate media and/or techniques.</td>
<td>Coherent oral presentation, thoughtful pedagogy, effective use of aids if and where appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldviews &amp; Ethics 7.1</td>
<td>The extent to which practitioners possess an in-depth and systemic understanding of the range of worldviews and ethics, and their accompanying perspectives (e.g., attitudes and beliefs, values, ways of being, ways of knowing, and ways of looking at the world) toward the environment, the future, and human activity in the environment; and their implications for EEC programs and initiatives.</td>
<td>Demonstrate comprehensive understanding of topic at hand, coherent development of argument or story, effective use of course reading to enhance presentation and develop argument or story.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldviews &amp; Ethics 7.2</td>
<td>The extent to which practitioners possess and can demonstrate an ability to respect, articulate and reflect critically on the range of worldviews and ethics, and their accompanying perspectives.</td>
<td>Demonstrate understanding of a range of extant perspectives and worldview related to the assignment topic, coherent development of argument or story, effective use of course reading to enhance presentation and develop argument or story.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldviews &amp; Ethics 7.3</td>
<td>Explain how in a personal sense one forms an environmental view through perceptual, attitudinal, core knowledge sets, and values acquired in a unique blending of interaction with nature and culture.</td>
<td>Demonstrate reflection about personal dimensions of values and ethics in light of assignment topics, coherent development of argument or story.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Due Dates</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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<td>Assignment #4</td>
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Fig. 7.1. Assessments.
Bob Jickling

the societal maps that perplexed Schumacher (1977) are “tracings from Descartes’s original, a map which excludes concrete experience in the world in favour of abstraction” (p. 54).

In announcing that this is a chapter about resistance, there is, I suppose, an expectation that I should own up to my own resistance. Most apparently, I have written this chapter and I give it to my students. I may not live up to their expectations, but it is a start; I point with it and hope. I do credit participation, but I call it an “action project.” I include items in my courses that defy reduction and evaluation and then grade these portions with a pass/fail system (playing havoc with standard deviations of mark distribution—for those who insist on caring about these things). And, I do field trips.

At another level, I have pointed to ways of knowing that cannot be said, and certainly not evaluated—to the happy learning that just announces itself. This is a kind of learning that is wrapped up in feelings—of joy, wonder, and sometimes anguish—and experience—especially in ontological attention and care for particulars. I have tried to write this chapter in a form that is consistent (even a little) with the functional need. If what is currently underrepresented, or absent, in education cannot be said, then it would be a misadventure to rely on an austere diet of analytic thinking and arcane theory. Zwicky (2002) experiments with metaphor to reach beyond skepticism and falsification as systems for determining knowing. Robert Bringhurst (2002) and Don McKay (2002) use poetry. Here, I point to experiences and have experimented with narrative accounts of these encounters—admittedly these accounts are just rough proxies for the phenomenal experiences themselves. Still I hope that when wedged between tidbits of residual academia, they will generate a glimmer of resonance.

In all, I haven’t accomplished a lot; but, I’m not looking for heroes. For surely, a single person cannot reverse a way of thinking deeply embedded in educational policy. There can be room for all to engage in some resistance. We must! (It is doubtful that this kind of change will come down from above.) There will be many ways to do this. I also like to make a little room for curriculum theorist Elliot Eisner’s (1985) “expressive outcomes.” These are the consequences of activities that are planned to provide rich learning opportunities but without explicit or precise objectives.

The aim here is to shift emphasis away from evaluation and back to considering what good learning opportunities would look like—first and foremost. As Eisner (1985) says, “The tack taken with respect to the generation of expressive outcomes is to engage in activities that are sufficiently rich to allow for a wide, productive range of educationally valuable outcomes” (p. 121).

A key point is that we should pay more attention to providing worthwhile activities—as whole entities—and worry less about grids of objectives, and conjured goals and outcomes. Can you, as an individual educator, work in even a little room for something like expressive outcomes? A place where you can just point and hope. Perhaps we can all do a little to resist the tyranny of misplaced evaluation.

A FINAL THOUGHT

As I finish I want us all to remember that happiness, joy, and knowing are not mutually exclusive. Feelings are at the heart of the most important knowing; they are at the heart of our capacity to be ethical beings. And, I want to encourage us all to find a little time for ourselves, and our students, to go outside and sit for a while on an old grey stone, to awaken ourselves and themselves to bodies that “feel, where’er they be, against or with our will.”
NOTES

1. This chapter does not focus explicitly on happiness, although this would make an important paper. Rather, I wish to draw attention to the ontological and epistemological conditions that may underlie experiences resulting in the notion of happiness described here.

2. However, as Anthony Weston (2004) points out, these experiences can take place inside, too.

3. There is not space to discuss this quotation at length. Although I acknowledge that some might draw on more abstract, or theoretical principles, for ethical inspiration, I maintain that Leopold’s (1970) thoughts are relevant, important, and illuminating.

REFERENCES


